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ABSTRACT
Creating international laws in an international system is a wellknown phenomenon. International organizations encourage the
creation and practice of normative behaviors by states that might
eventually be recognized as law by treaty or as common practice. While
international organizations are well-versed and focused on intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, in these studies,
the International Olympic Committee, (IOC) for all its years and
notoriety, has never been examined as a source of institutional law
making. This article examines the IOC’s relation to the norms and laws
pertaining to international labor rights. Why has an organization so
active in the creation of new jobs and the promotion of large-scale, state
projects been completely oblivious to the rights of workers? Examining
the case of China’s 2008 and 2022 Games, this article argues the IOC
has created few incentives to enforce or encourage a set of norms that
will inherently drive the cost of hosting up, and then, perhaps, the
commercial viability of the Games down. Ultimately, the IOC seemingly
surrenders its ability to incentivize change in state behaviors.
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INTRODUCTION
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has been referred to
as a global sporting organization (GSO) because, as an international
organization, it supersedes state authority.1 Indeed, the sports and the
sporting rules these organizations regulate are not bound by state
borders. Instead, they are in effect public property.2 These organizations
are also strictly international, unlike the private regulatory
organizations. One example is the International Organization for
Standardization.3 For the IOC to accomplish its mission, states’
cooperation or acquiescence is necessary.4 Competitions, even those at
the most localized level, often require government participation in the
allocation of space for an event to be held either through commercial
zoning or outright public ownership of a recreational facility.5

1. John Foster & Nigel K.W. Pope, The Political Economy of Global Sporting
Organizations 4 (Routledge ed., 2007).
2. Id.
3. About Us, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/aboutus.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
4. Id.
5. Eva Lechner & Harry Arne Solberg, The Competition for Government
Funding of Major Sports Events: Why do Some Applicants Pass the Needle’s Eye?,
13 INT’L J. OF SPORT POL’Y AND POL 13, 13 (2021).
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The process of choosing a host is perhaps the best example of this
cooperation.6 If potential hosts withdraw (as has been the case recently,
a phenomenon discussed further below), the IOC can be stripped of its
real influence. When states wish to host an expensive and overly
formalized selection process, they need to appease the IOC’s wishes.
This has led, in some instances, to a direct challenge of State
sovereignty and the centrality of the State within the international
system.
When the IOC, for instance, asks for assurances about security at
the Games, the bid-State would be admitting failure if it was unable or
unwilling to oblige the IOC.7 Classically, security is the greatest
concern of any State, and it is rare for a non-governmental organization
such as the IOC to affect their security policies. Nevertheless, the IOC
has a surprisingly successful track record when it comes to affecting
high-state policies, albeit often temporarily, in many of its hosts.8 This
has been demonstrated best when a host State does not diplomatically
recognize one of its fellow IOC members. In these cases, the laws
governing entry visas and accepting of formal documents need to be
adjusted.
Frustratingly for some, the IOC has seemed to be more rhetorical
and less substantive in its efforts to improve human rights. This is
especially so when one examines labor rights, an area in which the IOC
has made little headway in terms of empowering laborers or promoting
normative labor practices.9 Although a key aspect of its recently
approved Agenda 2020 + 5, the plight of vulnerable laborers around
event construction continues to be an underserved issue area within the
6. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER art. 33-34
(2020),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf [hereinafter OLYMPIC CHARTER].
7. See generally Philip Boyle & Kevin D. Haggerty, Spectacular Security:
Mega-Events and the Security Complex, 3 INT’L POL. SOCIO. 257, 263 (2009). Richard
Giulianotti & Franciso Klauser, Security Governance and Sport Mega-events:
Toward an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda, 34 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 1, 2 (2009).
8. Travis Nelson & M. Patrick Cottrell, Sport Without Referees? The Power of
the International Olympic Committee and the Social Politics of Accountability, 22
EURO. J. OF INT’L RELATIONS 1, 3 (2015).
9. Vivian Wang, Faced With Questions About Forced Labor in China, the
TIMES
(Jan.
4,
2022),
I.O.C.
Is
Tight-Lipped,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/world/asia/ioc-china.html.
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Olympic Movement.10 Events leading to Beijing 2008, Sochi 2014, and
presently Beijing 2022, raise questions regarding labor practices that
have gone largely unaddressed by the IOC. Instead, the organization
has often defended host States against criticisms.11
Since its inception, the politics surrounding the Olympic events,
also known as “mega-events,” have attracted a great deal of attention.
Hosting one of these events is often treated as a marker of international
legitimacy or modernity bestowed on the winning state.12 In turn, this
has led to an equally strong stereotype that the IOC is political in
nature.13 Despite the IOC’s insistence of neutrality, this contention
often serves only to validate critics claims. These critical narratives
often exaggerate the superficial political effects, like power or
economic gains, while overlooking or downplaying the actual
influences and consequences of the State’s interactions with these
bodies—primarily, a legitimization and reinforcement of regimes and
their policies, both international and domestic.
Why hasn’t the IOC moved to influence a State’s labor practices?
These practices directly tie to the Olympic Agenda and hosting
legacies. The IOC has stretched its influence to admit athletes from
unrecognized states14 or its behaviors in regards to LGBTQ+ citizens,15
so why stop there? This article seeks to understand the IOC’s place in
what is often referred to as institutional law making. In the international
10. Olympic Agenda 2020+5 15 Recommendations, INT’L OLYMPIC
COMM.,https://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IO
C/What-We-Do/Olympic-agenda/Olympic-Agenda-2020-5-15recommendations.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2022) [hereinafter Olympic Agenda].
11. Wang, supra note 9.
12. Vishvas Nandwani, Why do Countries Want to Host the Olympics?, ITAT
ORDERS (Aug. 3, 2021), https://itatorders.in/blog/why-do-countries-want-to-host-theolympics/.
13. Jules Boykoff, The Olympics are Political. The IOC Ban Denies Reality —
NEWS
(Jan.
16,
2020),
and
Athletes
their
Voice,
NBC
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/olympics-are-political-ioc-ban-deniesreality-athletes-their-voice-ncna1117306.
14. Parade of Nations: Which Countries Are (and aren’t) in the Olympics?,
POL. GEOGRAPHY NOW (Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.polgeonow.com.
15. Olympic Agenda, supra note 10; IOC Framework on Fairness, Inclusion
and Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity and Sex Variations, INT’L
OLYMPIC
COMM.,
https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/News/2021/11/IOC-FrameworkFairness-Inclusion-Non-discrimination-2021.pdf.
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system, States interact with and participate in a collection of
organizations in bi- or multi-lateral relations. These interactions can
produce regularized behaviors that have the tendency to become (via
treaty) law or treated as law through customary practice. The IOC, like
other international organizations, has an opportunity to affect this
process, and create customary practices, if not law.
This article’s purpose is not to revisit the familiar debates about the
value of hosting such events, but to examine the role of these
organizations in affecting the opinio juris, or the sense of legal
obligation a State believes it has in the international system.
Institutional law making is a well-known potential, if not always actual,
consequence of the deepening interdependence of States within an everexpanding system of IOs. What role does the IOC play in this process
and what this suggest for our current understanding of institutional law
making?
The argument herein is that the IOC ultimately occupies a
precarious position in the international system. The IOC sits at the top
of the international sporting regime, but is also a part of the broader
international diplomatic institution: one that values free exchange and
an equality among nations. The IOC also encourages the adoption of
certain rights and values, including those regarding the treatment of
laborers. Today, it more commonly interprets its role in relation to the
former position: a functional role as keeper of the Olympics, which is
increasingly defined as a commercial product. When the IOC has acted
to influence States and forwards a legal outcome among its members
(the Taiwan issue,16 the South African sporting boycotts,17 the creations
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport18 and later the World Anti-Doping
Agency19) it has operationalized the latter role.

16. Davis Van Opdorp, Beijing 2022: Taiwan remains hot-button issue at
Olympics, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 19, 2022), https://www.dw.com/en/beijing-2022taiwan-remains-hot-button-issue-at-olympics/a-60840768.
17. Matt Bersell, Sports, Race, and Politics: The Olympic Boycott of Apartheid
Sport, 8 W. ILL HISTORICAL REV. 1, 1-2 (2017).
18. See generally Richard H. McLaren, Introducing the Court of Arbitration for
Sport: The Ad Hoc Division at the Olympic Games, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 515
(2001).
19. Who We Are, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wadaama.org/en/who-we-are (last visited Mar. 6, 2022).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

5

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 [], Art. 6

428 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
This article continues in four parts beginning with an introduction
to the concept of institutional law making. This is followed by a
discussion about the IOC and the Olympics as aspects of the
international system, including actors in the process of institutional law
making. After introducing China’s history of migratory labor laws, a
discussion of the 2008 and 2022 Olympics concludes the argument.
I. INSTITUTIONAL LAW MAKING
Creating new institutional law is often hard to define and typically
only identified in hindsight, after the process is complete and a law has
already been recognized.20 In general, it refers to laws that emerge
through the repeated interactions of state governments with
international organizations, transnational networks, and their peers as a
consequence of their interdependent activities.21 In other words, laws
emerge through their activities in international institutions. A wide
variety of definitions exist identifying institutions. These institutions
are identified as “relatively stable sets of related constitutive,
regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the
international system, the actors in the system (including States as well
as non-State entities), and their activities.”22
In fact, the United Nations (UN) itself is often misidentified as an
international institution.23 The UN is the hub of one of the more
dominant institutions we recognize today, that of multilateral
governance, in which each state is an equal. In Rita Guerreiro Teixeira’s
recent examination of IOs’ role in environmental law, she notes:
[T]he UN has convened the Global Conferences, leading to the
adoption of foundational declaration of principles, and numerous
other international organizations have prepared draft texts, promoted
20. See generally N. D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
(2nd ed. 2005) (offering a fuller examination of the variety of definitions that have
been operationalized in the study of international organizations).
21. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L
STUD. Q. 379, 384 (1988).
22. John S. Duffield, What Are International Institutions?, 9 INT’L STUD. REV.
1, 2 (2007).
23. See A. WIVEL & T.V. PAUL, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND POWER
POLITICS: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE (A. Wivel & T.V. Paul eds., 2019) (treating
“international organization” and “international institution” as synonyms).
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the conclusion of environmental agreements, adopted standards,
guidelines and recommendations, and prepared influential studies.24

Each of these activities has been taken up by these respective bodies
as a result of the need for governance with regards to issues States have
a shared interest in. These are also points on which common behaviors
and norms will emerge as a result of institutional practices.
The international system is familiarly characterized as anarchic, as
it does not have a singular world government.25 In the absence of such
a body, governance is practiced by States in any number of
organizations and institutional settings.26 The most familiar example of
this being the United Nations, an inter-governmental organization
(IGO) made up of all recognized States in the international system. This
is one example of States acting unilaterally and agreeing between
themselves to certain behaviors with an eye to creating predictable and
regularized behaviors that might be added to this. Examples of
governance like this create customs that approach the status of law. This

24. Rita Guerreiro Teixeira, The Role of International Organizations in the
Development of International Environmental Law: Adjusting the Lenses of Analysis,
53 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 237, 237 (2021).
25. Silviya Lechner, Anarchy in International Relations, INT’L STUD. ASSOC.
AND
OXFORD
UNIV.
PRESS
(Feb.
24,
2022),
https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.00
1.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-79.
26. Forgoing a discussion about how and why cooperation is achieved in
anarchy the reader is referred to. See generally Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane,
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL.
226 (1985); David A. Lake, Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy
in World Politics, 32 INT’L SEC. 47 (2007); Alexander Wendt, , Anarchy is What
States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391
(1992).
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has been largely accepted.27 However, debates are still ongoing as to
what behaviors do and do not amount to law.28
Indeed, international law does not resemble domestic law. Of
particular interest is what contributes to the ability of international
institutions to help create international law. The clearest and longest
accepted form of international law—treaties—are the business of
States, and while it is true many IOs like the United Nations will
manage or house treaty bodies within their own frameworks, only
States may create and join them.29 This has arguably left customary
international law (CIL) as the only space from which institutions might
influence international law. This often relies on the activities of the nonState organs within them, but what agency do IOs have in the creation
of CILs?
There are two broad answers to this question. On the one hand,
organizations are not independent of States and do not possess a
juridical independence. On the other, the monitoring and compliance
activities of these actors do seem to suggest that they play a role in
creating customary international law. By reinforcing the “good”
behaviors and punishing or discouraging the “bad,” IOs are said to
increase a sense of opinio juris among states in relation to certain
behaviors.30 Still, to what degree IOs are leading States, as opposed to
the reverse, is continually debated.31 To a great degree, the problem lies
in the bifurcation of international law as either “hard” or “soft.”
27. That customary international law is accepted as a valid form of international
law has been repeatedly affirmed by the International Court of Justice. Comments on
its value and interpretation by the International Law Commission, not to mention
many legal scholars, usually take this as their starting point. See How the Court Works,
INT’L CT. OF JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/how-the-court-works (last visited Mar.
7, 2022); Philippe Couvreur, Upholding the Rule of Law at the International Level:
The Role of the International Court of Justice, UN CHRON.,
https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/upholding-rule-law-international-level-roleinternational-court-justice (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
28. See R. B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old
challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 173, 178-79 (2010).
29. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal
International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 5 (1998).
30. Ronald Alcala, Opinio Juris and the Essential Role of States, LIEBER INST.
(Feb. 11, 2021), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/opinio-juris-essential-role-states/.
31. See generally CATHERINE BROLMANN, CAPTURING THE JURIDICAL WILL OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (Sufyan Droubi & Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2020).
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In brief, hard laws are those that are considered binding on States,
whereas soft laws are considered non-binding or can be derogated.32
Hard laws tend to be most commonly recognized in the realms of
security and conflict. The Geneva Conventions (1949) and the
prohibition of crimes against humanity, such as those in the Genocide
Convention of 1948, are commonly treated as hard law, while human
rights such as the freedoms of assembly and right to due process have
been derogated during times of crisis.33 Furthermore, hard laws tend to
be codified in treaty form, whereas soft laws are customary practices.34
The customary nature leads some to question the legal status of certain
“soft” laws.35
Because hard laws are typically enshrined in treaties, and treaties
are the provenance of States, there is no question of opinio juris.
Conversely, IOs tend to be active norm entrepreneurs, especially in the
area of rights.36 That security-based law tends to be considered hard,
and human rights-focused law considered soft is due to the evolution of
international law over the last century. Nevertheless, the sovereignty of
states and state power have stubbornly remained front and center.
A. Historical Development
A comprehensive examination of the advent of international law’s
changes across time is beyond the scope of this article. Still, a narrowed
32. Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706,
712-13 (2010); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421-22 (2000).
33. In the U.S. alone, Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil
War, the Espionage Act under Wilson, and the internment of Japanese American
citizens during World War II are examples of just such behaviors. In each case the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the governments right to do so. See generally Ex Parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Hernan Montealegre, The
Compatibility of a State Party’s Derogation Under Human Rights Conventions with
its Obligations Under Protocols II and Common Article 3, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 41
(1983–1984).
34. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 32, at 767.
35. Id. at 720.
36. Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms:
UNESCO and Science Policy, 47 INT’L ORG. 565, 566 (1993).
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examination of the genesis of the United Nations system does bear on
the debate over the role of the IOC.37 Prior to the end of World War II
and the advent of the United Nations, states as political units had
enjoyed an almost unchallenged position as the creators of international
law. This position was mostly accomplished through treaties and the
belief in pacta sunt servanda, or “agreements must be kept.”38 If a state
signed a treaty, it was a commitment to certain behavior. States
expected other respective States to comply.39 There was no law
governing treaties and their formation until the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties of 1969.40 Much of the belief in a treaty’s power to
bind states fell to what we might consider a state’s honor. To break
one’s word would bring dishonor to a State, government, or leader.
For much of the early twentieth century, the supremacy of a state’s
sovereign right to govern its affairs, and thus the primacy of domestic
law over any international “law,” save what a State voluntarily chose to
follow, was not in doubt.41 Alternatively, several examples in
diplomatic history would suggest, at the very least, a growing
recognition by this time of a mutually affirmed understanding that there
were rules, if not proper laws, governing the international system. For
instance, while maintaining the primacy of British law over the
international, Sir Edward Grey’s Foreign Office often relied on an
implied code of conduct, either supported by tradition or the honor of
nations.42 Like other statesmen of the time, Grey would leave the
particulars of what international law required of the state vague, thereby

37. The international system, it has been argued, did not exist as a truly
international system until the twentieth century. See MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN
A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 67 (Lynne Reiner, 3rd ed. 2010).
38. Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: a Meditation, 34 VA J. INT’L L. 405,
406 (1994).
39. Id. at 421.
40. It has only been effective since 1980. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
41. J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing
Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT’L ORGS. 107,
111 (1994).
42. See Clive Parry, Foreign Policy and International Law, in BRITISH FOREIGN
POLICY UNDER SIR EDWARD GREY 89-112 (F.H. Hinsley, ed., 1977).
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never bringing the domestic law into conflict with the international;43
thus, never forcing the state to choose between the two to demonstrate
some finality of which level of governance was subservient to the other.
It is true most states enjoyed the privilege of interpreting
international responsibilities and laws in ways that suited their needs.
Prior to World War I, the United States, which was expressly neutral in
European affairs, hoped this stance would allow it to freely move goods
across the increasingly hostile Atlantic waters.44 Here, the United
States called into play the international conventions regarding neutral
states, the laws of the sea, and those of trade as well.45 To be sure,
Washington D.C. was not, by any stretch, a center for internationalist
sympathies at this time, but did desire to impress upon Europe a shared
obligation, even if only to enjoy American goods.
After World War I, the efforts to create and then buttress the League
of Nations saw renewed support of the claim that some international
rules were to be abided by, at the very least.46 On the one hand, British
efforts to support the League’s efforts in 1937 to create an international,
permanent court demonstrated the need the British government saw for
an international code to address such crimes.47 On the other hand, in the
British’s efforts to derail international rules, the court demonstrated its
belief that the international court’s success could pin the British
government to certain behaviors it might later discover restricted its
sovereignty in the future.48
43. Id. This was not always successful and the United Kingdom, like other
States, would find themselves having to reconcile, often with great difficulty,
domestic behaviors with international prescripts and vice versa.
44. Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and Freedom of the Seas, NAVAL HIST. &
HERITAGE COMMAND, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/browseby-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-i/history/ww1-freedom-ofseas.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
45. The contemporary weight of the Freedom of the Seas is often lost in today’s
discussion of the period. See E.S. Corwin, The Freedom of the Seas, 209 N. AM. REV.
29, 30-31 (1919) (providing pre- and post-World War I commentary).
46. Gabriela A. Frei, International Law and the First World War: Introduction,
29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 229, 230 (2018).
47. Suzane Katzenstein, In the Shadow of Crisis: The Creation of International
Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 154, 184 (2014).
48. See MICHAEL CALLAHAN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1934–1938 (Palgrave Macmillan ed.,
2018) (providing a full examination of British response to international rules).
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Growing interdependence among nations, both economically and
politically, meant the consequences of a state’s behaviors, or non-state
actors within it, did not stop at its border. The period from the beginning
of World War I, through the Great Depression, and on to the end of
World War II, often referred to as the Thirty-Year Crisis, demonstrated
this fact quite clearly. Financial concerns, increased migration, and the
concerns of increasing anarcho-syndicalist terror shattered the
unilateral policymaking processes across many issue areas.49 The
United States, for instance, would find that its former approaches to
deporting undesirables would no longer be acceptable to many of its
allies.50 Issues of borders and who passed in either direction would
require at least two states to settle the issue of sending and receiving.51
Many of these issues were difficult enough to solve bilaterally, and
as an international issue, with innumerable points of view and veto
players often proved intractable. The above-referenced effort for a
permanent terror court at the League, even with wide support in general,
proved too tricky in the specifics of operational minutiae to succeed.52
The League itself could never overcome the hesitancy that many states
had in aligning themselves and their sovereignty with the League’s
activities.53 The question was, at that time, as it has often been repeated
and rephrased since, whether such a thing as international law existed
or should exist.
There was, in fact, one area in which almost all would agree
international law was thriving: war.54 Since the nineteenth century,
49. See The Voyage of the Buford: Political Deportations and the Making and
Unmaking of America’s First Red Scare, in 132 DEPORTATION IN THE AMERICAS:
HISTORIES OF EXCLUSION AND RESISTANCE (Kenyon Zimmer & Cristina Salinas
eds., 2018).
50. Id. Mexico especially did not appreciate U.S. deportations because nonMexicans were deposited at Mexico’s borders. The United States viewed European
states as the source of anarchists and Communists. Mexico and European
governments wanted a greater say in who was being deported to them and what
responsibilities they had to the United States.
51. Id.
52. CALLAHAN, supra note 48, at 7-8.
53. Katzenstein, supra note 47, at 190.
54. War was most famously referred to as a natural phenomenon by Hugo
Grotius. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 18-20 (Oxford
Clarendon Press ed., 1625). Later, Carl von Clausewitz, suggested war is the normal
“continuation of [politics] by other means.” See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87
(Michael Howard & Peter Pare eds., 1832). Modern adherents include realist thinker
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conflict among nations had many rules and regulations that States
adhered to.55 War has always been the business of states, and it would
occur when and where states chose; this was never in doubt.56 The
conduct of forces within it, the outcome, and whether justice was truly
done were never (and still is not) guaranteed. Yet early twentieth
century moves to codify the practices within warfare were quite
common. From 1899, through the First World War and then the Second,
rules regarding the treatment of prisoners and civilians were introduced
and strengthened.57 That the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was thought
to end the war as a legal means of resolution may have been naïve, but
it at least demonstrated the belief that war could be codified, or even
outlawed.
That war, which only states can engage in, would find such a robust
legal system is perhaps not surprising. Armed conflict has always been
recognized as an extension of state politics, and war, like diplomacy,
would also be governed by tradition and rules.58 The consequences of
winning or losing a war could mean the end of a regime or even a state
in toto. There was a great interest in how these wars would be
prosecuted and what would happen to those who did not abide by the
rules. With the Treaty of Fontainebleau and Napoleon’s exile to the
island of Elba, the proposition had been introduced that a collection of
states could bind themselves to the task of punishing a shared foe for
their behaviors during times of war. At the close of World War II, the
international community would again, in Nuremberg and Tokyo,

Hans Morgenthau who argued that States behave as individuals do in conflict in
anarchy. See HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE (Alfred Knopf ed., 1948); KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE,
AND WAR 11 (COLUM. UNIV. PRESS ED., 1959) (Morgenthau and Waltz both argued
there was no morality in war, and power to act was the only determinant of right or
wrong, just, or unjust).
55. The first humanitarian code of conflict, the Lieber Code, only applied to the
U.S. North in the U.S. Civil War in 1863. Howard S. Levie. History of The Law of
War on Land, 838 I.R.R.C. 339, 340 (2000). Also in 1863 was the first Geneva
Convention. Id. at 341. In 1874 a conference in Belgium produced the Declaration
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Id.
56. See generally Levie, supra note 55, at 339.
57. Id. at 343.
58. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 23 (Michael Howard & Peter Pare
eds., 1832) (defining war as a “mere continuation of policy by other means.”).
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respectively, bind themselves together to see that international laws of
war were observed.59
The narrative of international law emerging from war often
increases the place of states in the formation of this law and downplays
the activities of civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and international institutions. The laws regarding the humanitarian
aspects of conflict were a direct result of the activities and efforts of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, one of the first modern
NGOs.60 The turn of the twentieth century also saw a number of peace
movements emerge from a growing sense of cosmopolitanism in
Europe. The IOC itself was formed in parallel to these pacific
organizations, and they gave rhetorical purchase to the idea of shared
humanity.61
The peace envisioned largely concerned the nations of Europe and
did not extend to Africa, Asia, and the colonized peoples throughout the
world.62 This narrow concept of peace is an important point and one
that will be revisited when the development of customary international
law is discussed below. For now, the fact that the high politics of states,
including the practice of war, were being shaped by civil society and
emerging non-governmental organizations only need be acknowledged
here. The popular conclusion that the League of Nations failed and that
the Great Powers of Europe similarly failed to understand the
continental balance of power sufficiently to prevent World War I
dominates the narrative.63 This narrative ignores the fact that the
59. The Treaty of Fontainebleau acted as an explicit reference for these
tribunals. See M.R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1954–46: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Bedford Books eds., 1997). The maligned German-signed
Kellogg-Briand Pact forms the basis of Nazi Germany’s illegal activities. See Julie
M. Bunck & Michael R. Fowler, The Kellogg-Briand Pact: A Reappraisal, 27 TUL.
J. INTL. & COMP. L. 229, 230 (2019).
60. Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of NonGovernmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD.,
579, 583 (1999).
61. D. R. Quanz, Civic Pacifism and Sports-Based Internationalism:
Framework for the Founding of the International Olympic Committee, 2 OLYMPIKA:
INT’L J. OLYMPIC STUD. 1 (1993).
62. See, e.g., MURIEL E. CHAMBERLAIN, PAX BRITANICA? BRITISH FOREIGN
POLICY 1789–1914 (Routledge ed., 1989).
63. Jari Eloranta, Why did the League of Nations Fail?, 5 CLIOMETRICA 27, 27
(2005).
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League was successful in preventing war in 193464 and that civil society
similarly failed in overcoming national sympathies.65
After World War II and the advent of the United Nations, the
universe of international organizations expanded rapidly. The Bretton
Woods System, designed by the United States, institutionalized
financial relations among states while the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GATT) regulated trade.66 Europe too began to
institutionalize its relations through the European Coal and Steel
Community as well as the European Economic Community.67 It is at
this point in time that we might be closer to the locus of institutional
lawmaking. As more states began to join these organizations, they
likewise began to bring their behaviors into line with their rules and
regulations. They also acted to create, through their mechanisms and
reporting processes, new rules by which members should abide.
During the Cold War, this creation of new rules was especially
prevalent in areas that were framed as or by security concerns. The
destructive power of the nuclear weapon as well as the growing postcolonial movement were reshaping the concerns of states, which is not
to say that power and the state monopoly of the legitimate use of force
were devalued.68 The IOC, like the United Nations and other IOs, found
itself at the mercy of the East-West political tug-of-war.69 IOs were
beholden to the West, as the Soviet system lacked equivalent
64. CALLAHAN, supra note 48, at 7.
65. The international workers’ movements, anarchist, syndicalist, and
communist, were weakened by the national divisions ending solidarity with the First
World War. See James Riordan, Worker Sport, in BERKSHIRE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD SPORT 457, 458 (2005); Stephen Jones, The European Workers’ Sport
Movement and Organized Labour in Britain Between the Wars, 18 EUR. HIST. Q. 3,
3-4 (1988) (placing divisions in context of international sport).
66. Sandra Kollen Ghizoni, Creation of The Bretton Woods System, FED. RSRV.
HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bretton-woodscreated.
67. Barry Eichengreen, European Economic Community, ECONLIB,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/EuropeanEconomicCommunity.html
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2022).
68. David Ropeik, The Rise of Nuclear Fear: How We Learned to Fear the
Radiation, SCI. AM. (June 15, 2012), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guestblog/the-rise-of-nuclear-fear-how-we-learned-to-fear-the-bomb/.
69. Dilek Latif, United Nations’ Changing Role in the Post- Cold War Era, 30
TURKISH Y.B. 23, 27 (2000).
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development and international interdependence, and thus most of the
Cold War-era events were hosted in countries which identified with the
capitalist, democratic world order.
Despite this, it was a time when regularized meetings, uniform
calendars for international business and politics, as well as the
emergence of norm entrepreneurs began to rapidly appear.70 The
centralization of certain governance functions at the United Nations or
the European Economic Community made creating common policies
more convenient than ad hoc conferences to address individual issues
of governance as had been done in the past.71 So too, the practice of
institutional lawmaking could be observed with growing regularity, but
it fully blossomed after the Cold War.72
The dissolution of the Soviet system made previously untenable
powers or activities of IOs possible. For instance, the United Nations
Council on Human Rights (UNCHR) saw the Cold War as a contentious
organ with all states that were wary of expanding or empowering the
UNCHR.73 states were more concerned with preserving their
sovereignty than the increased prevalence of respect for basic human
rights. After the Cold War, the UNCHR became more active and
empowered to both publicly shame states for their poor behaviors and
advise them on proper behaviors.74 The UNCHR shift represented a
move towards global norms and standards of behavior as a foundation
for legitimate state behaviors.
An increase in the advancement of CIL occurred when normative
practices previously confined to the West were raised in status to and
were included in emerging treaty bodies.75 The challenges to the
traditional means of creating international law became more apparent

70. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORGS. 887, 909 (1998).
71. Latif, supra note 69, at 34.
72. Id.
73. James H. Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation
of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 861, 863
(2006).
74. Id. at 866.
75. See Leslie Deak, Customary International Labor Laws and their
Application in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J. INT’L L. 1, 14
(1994).
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as aspirational designs provided better standards of behavior.76 Those
who advocated this viewpoint highlighted that the traditional means of
creating international law were captured by a select few states, leaving
out a substantial portion of the international community.77 As noted
above, the Eurocentrism of the international order devalued the status
of non-European states and isolated them outside the legitimate
business of the day.
This increase in CIL benefitted issues like labor rights, the
existence of which had largely been identified only as a domestic matter
for much of the twentieth century.78 Labor rights might not be some of
the oldest internationally acknowledged rights, but they are often the
first to be recognized by liberalizing states.79 They were the progeny of
efforts to eradicate the slave trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries containing the antecedents of more modern conceptions
regarding the individual and the right to self-determination.80 The
ability to form collectives, or unions, that guaranteed remuneration and
fair practices, as well as safety standards, were certainly still some years
off. Many of the familiar characteristics of the labor rights regime did
not take shape until the latter twentieth century and, unfortunately,
continue to be unfulfilled in many parts of the world.81
With the advance of the welfare-state, the focus of labor in the
twentieth century has moved from a classic collective action problem
(organizing and dissuading free-riding) to a post-modern issue
(migration and sustainability).82 While, as suggested prior, the state
remains the focal point for international activity, the post-Cold War
process of globalization has altered this position. This process has
76. See generally Baker, supra note 28, at 184-89.
77. B.S. Chimini, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective,
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 33 (2018).
78. Deak, supra note 75, at 13.
79. See JOE FOWERAKER & TODD LANDMAN, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (Oxford University Press,
1997).
80. Caitlin Rosenthal, How the History of Slavery in America Offers an
(Aug.
30,
2018),
Important
Labor
Day
Lesson,
TIME
https://time.com/5377803/slavery-labor-day/.
81. Anke Hassel, The Evolution of a Global Labor Governance Regime, 21
GOVERNANCE 231, 238 (2008).
82. G.P. Freeman, Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State,
485 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POL. SCI. 1 (1986).
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weakened the state’s position and the classic conception of borders that
shaped the state-citizen relationship. In short, states began to serve
citizens (social security and services) instead of the other way round
(military conscription and centralized economies).83
Many states found that the free(er) movement of people and ideas
challenged their previous conceptions of the world and their place in it.
For instance, large influxes of migrant laborers routinely made native
laborers sensitive to economic competition, whose impacts were often
only imagined.84 The impact is a familiar root for the fomentation of
nationalist rhetoric or xenophobic politics.85 The international
movement of people was not the only concern of many states. The
internal movement of people also proved to be a challenge to
hegemonic social structures and political regimes.86 This internal
migratory pattern, predominantly rural citizens moving to urban,
industrial areas, has been of particular concern for the People’s
Republic of China since its inception.
B. Modern Interpretations and Examples
As international activities were sunk deeper into the growing
number of international organizations, two key assumptions about IOs
emerged. First, since these organizations’ members are states, the
organizations must inherently reflect cooperation among states;
“[s]ince cooperation is a good thing, so too… are international

83. F. Nullmeier, & F.X. Kaufmann, Post-War Welfare State Development, in 81
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE (Oxford University Press ed.,
2010).
84. See Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Consequences of The International
Migration of Labor, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 179, 199-202 (2009) (summarizing research).
85. Jonathan Crush, The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and
Human Rights in South Africa, 38 INT’L MIGRATION 103, 105 (2001); C. Ruzza,
Populism, migration, and xenophobia in Europe, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL POPULISM, 201-216 (Routledge ed., 2018).
86. Denise Hare, ‘Push’ Versus ‘Pull’ Factors in Migration Outflows and
Returns: Determinants of Migration Status and Spell Duration Among China’s Rural
Population, 35 J. DEV. STUD., 3, 45–72 (1999); VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE & DAVID
ROLAND-HOLST, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH PAPER 2009/50: GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR INCREASING DEVELOPING COUNTRY MIGRATION INTO
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (UN Development Programme Human Development
Reports ed., 2009).
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organizations.”87 Second, IOs were assumed to be solely the
instruments through which states saw their cooperative arrangements
completed.88 There existed no independent act or thought from these
organs to save those states imbued with them. They were functional,
not sovereign.
On the first point, institutionalism in the international system has
been championed as a corrective for a history of destructive behaviors
by states.89 Colonialism, mercantilism, and the narrow self-interest that
preceded the United Nations era would be outlawed or regulated.90 The
states had lofty goals to achieve cooperation and solutions through
diplomatic means as the norm. It would beggar belief to think that some
saw a utopian end arising from the floor of the United Nations General
Assembly. It was absolutely true that participation in these institutions
did reflect on the member nations, or it may be more accurate to say it
reflected on the non-participants.
If the dominant trend in the post-World War II era was deepening
ties to and within IOs for the purpose of institutionalizing multilateral
governance, then those states who chose not to participate must clearly
have been against cooperation and for war or conflict. It is worth
remembering that the West dominated much of the international
organizational ecosystem, thus delegitimizing much of the East almost
by design.91 Participation for its own sake, and not outcomes as a result
of cooperative participation, was in a sense being incentivized as to be
outside the legitimate world order. As a result, such participation could
damage a state, reputationally and materially. States, for instance, who
chose not to participate in the UNCHR’s review process were easily
delegitimized as international pariahs.92
87. Jan Klabbers, The Emergence of Functionalism in International
Institutional Law: Colonial Inspirations, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 645, 646 (2014).
88. Id.
89. Karns & Mingst, supra note 37, at 47.
90. Id.
91. Communist states were not technically barred from many international
organizations they did not join because many rules and expectations in membership
would be difficult to reconcile with Communist systems. Free trade and market
reforms kept the Soviet Union out of the GATT and did not become an observer until
1990. See Kazimierz Grzybowski, International Organizations from the Soviet Point
of View, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 882, 885 (1964).
92. Lebovic & Voeten, supra note 73, at 868.
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Thomas Franck’s major argument in The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations was that law as we understand it, as citizens within our
respective states, does not exist in the international system.93 That states
behave in a manner akin to law-abiding most of the time has nothing to
do with the fear of punishment or reprisal, but rather with the alternative
of having to exist outside of the legitimate world order. For example,
the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is keen to use
the Six-Party Talks and not piracy to acquire material likely does not
convince anyone the Kim Jung Un’s regime is “legitimate.”94 However,
we take several international norms of behavior for granted that are
apparent upon their violation.
Within the past seven years of this writing, the United Kingdom
voted to leave the European Union, the United States engaged in a trade
war with China, and Russia annexed a portion of Ukraine. These three
acts were greeted with international reprobation. Each act respectively
represented an example of a violation of a hard law (respect of
sovereign borders), an international rule (the World Trade
Organization’s rule of equal tariff rates among members), and a norm
(the principle of multilateralism).95 Most of the time, these are the sorts
of activities states do not violate, kept in check by the compliance pull
of legitimacy.96
The George W. Bush administration’s seeking of United Nations
Security Council approval of its (eventual) 2003 invasion of Iraq is a
good example of compliance.97 The United Kingdom’s 2013 attempt to
reconcile unilateral actions in Syria to the United Nations’
“Responsibility to Protect” paradigm is another example.98 Acting

93. See generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS 5-6 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1990).
91. Christine Gray, A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security
System?, 56 INT’L & COMPARATIVE L. Q., 157, 162 (2007).
95. Note well that the U.S., U.K., and Russia are world powers and each act
mentioned concerned domestic responses over international. A full individual and
comparative examination of their acts is beyond the scope of this paper.
96. FRANCK, supra note 93, at 7-8.
97. George Bush’s Speech to the UN General Assembly, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
12, 2002), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/12/iraq.usa3.
98. See Sufyan Droubi, Opinio Juris: Between Mental States and Institutional,
in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, NON-STATE ACTORS, AND THE FORMATION OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (Manchester Univ. Press 2020).
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through and with IOs is thought to add legitimacy to state behaviors as
they, quite visibly, provide an objective conclusion on said activities.99
Had the United Nations Security Council approved the United States’
invasion of Iraq, it would have sent a strong signal to international
audiences that what the Bush administration planned was just and in
line with the norms and behaviors of legitimate actors. In other words,
it would not be the unilateral action of a self-interested state, the sort of
behavior the present international system abhorred.
That the Soviet Union sought admission to the IOC while it took
on its United Nations responsibilities is perhaps best viewed in this
light. The Soviets had eschewed, for the most part, the international
order, sporting, and all, in favor of its own institutions.100 After World
War II, the Soviet Union sought admittance into the IOC, but found its
domestic laws would first need to be reconciled with the rules and
regulations of those of the Olympic community.101 This meant Moscow
had to relinquish hegemonic control of its sporting calendar and
competitions to the various sports’ international federations and cease
the state sponsorship of sports and athletes, a violation of the principle
of amateurism.102
Moreover, functionalism has legally come to dominate the
interpretation of IO actions in the international system. This view
isolates IOs from the broader institutions and limits their understanding
to just their design. Functionalism also privileges the agency of states
and reinforces the lack of judicial independence and legal agency
among IOs. Consequently, IOs are unable to affect the opinio juris of
states because states imbue their instruments with such a sense of legal
obligation.
99. Terrence L. Chapman & Dan Reiter, The United Nations Security Council
and The Rally’round The Flag Effect, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 886, 890 (2004).
100. These sporting institutions included the Red Sport International (sporting),
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (economic), and Warsaw Pact (security).
101. Jörg Krieger & Austin Duckworth, ‘Vodka and Caviar Among Friends’—
Lord David Burghley and the Soviet Union’s Entry into the International Association
of Athletic Federations, 41 SPORT IN HIST. 260, 280 (2021).
102. See Allen Guttmann, The Cold War and the Olympics, 43 INT’L J. 554, 556
(1988) (discussing Soviet Russia’s difficulty ending state sponsorship to meet amateur
rules). While there would never be satisfaction for many as to the amateur status of
Communist system athletes, it should be noted that the United States collegiate
athletics practices were indistinguishable.
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The opinio juris debate around IOs is particularly strong as it
concerns customary law. As mentioned above, this is the realm of
international law and we would expect to see the most activity from
these organizations. There are well-reasoned points to be made about
why IOs do not affect the legal obligations of states. Still, these are often
static in that they treat uniformly the many and varied organizations and
their similarly varied relationships with states.103
For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) is
very much an organization that requires the member states to give it
agency. Perhaps for obvious reasons: NATO as a military agent, acting
on its own or even with greater autonomy might do more harm than
good no matter its objectives. Conversely, much of the international
human rights regime functions outside the purview of state discretion.
In the former case, states necessarily legitimate the use of force, while
in the latter, states are the locust of human rights behavior, good and
bad, and need to be observed by an independent actor.104
The framework by which we understand the state—the IO
relationship is often illustrated as a hierarchy: states act as principals
delegating tasks to their agents, in this case, IOs.105 The dominant
assumption is that states delegate to IOs to increase the legitimacy of
their activities.106 Only the most fervent realist, one who understands
the international system as state-centric, would accept this assertion in
total today. A great deal of international law has emerged from the floor
of the United Nations General Assembly. For instance, the principle of
103. See Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT’L L. 101, 104 (1987) (in which the author vivisects the International Court of
Justice’s Nicaragua (1984) ruling).
104. See Eva Herschinger, Markus Jachtenfuchs, & Christiane Kraft-Kasack,
Scratching the Heart of the Artichoke? How International Institutions and the
European Union Constrain the State Monopoly of Force, 3 EURO. POL. SCI. R. 445,
450 (2011), for a fuller examination of the effect of institutions on a State’s monopoly
on force.
105. See DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, & Michael J. Tierney, &
Cambridge Univ. Press eds., 2006).
106. See generally T.L. Chapman & Reiter, supra note 59; FABRIZIO GILARDI,
DELEGATION IN THE REGULATORY STATE: INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN
WESTERN EUROPE (Cheltenham, U.K. & Edward Elgar eds., 2008); Daniel J. Nielson
& Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and
World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241, 242 (2003).
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“common heritage” appears in the Treaty on Outer Space (1967) and
the Convention on Law of the Sea (1982).107 Far from merely acting as
repositories for treaties or the instrument by which a state carries out
business, IOs have become more proactive, or even, as is the case with
the European Court of Justice, uncharacteristically powerful relative to
its members.108
There is no issue area where this has been more apparent than the
international environmental regime. The regularized conferences of the
parties (COPs), the empowerment of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) through the Paris Agreement, and the simplified legislative
practices embedded in many of the environmental agreements are all
entry points for IOs to inform the creation of international law.109
Unlike sports, though, sophisticated regulatory practices dominate the
environmental regime, minimizing customary law in environmental
issues.110 Therefore, the practices that do emerge in the sporting regime
are more likely to be soft law, and their status as law, less clear.
All these issues matter to our understanding of the IOC and its
ability to participate in the promotion or creation of international norms
of behavior. Institutionally, there are strong arguments for the power
this organization is thought to have over states; functionally, on the
other hand, there are significant questions, not about what the IOC does
or is meant to do, but what it chooses to do and why. In short, the IOC
has a greater opportunity to affect state behavior when acting as part of
the broader international institutional system but has operationalized its
mission (its functionality) as commercial.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
In the study of IOs, sporting organizations like the IOC and the
equally maligned International Federation of Association Football
107. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 37, at 103.
108. Karen J. Alter, Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European
Governments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 121 (1998).
109. See generally ALIX DIETZEL, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND CLIMATE
GOVERNANCE: BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE (Edinburgh University Press ed.,
2014); M. HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
(Routledge ed., 2019).
110. Teixeira, supra note 24, at 254.
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(FIFA) are largely ignored. Political scientists have dismissed their
import either because of these organizations’ status as nuclei for forms
of commercial entertainment or the outright acceptance of their nonpolitical declarations.111 Both FIFA and the IOC have longer histories
than the United Nations and more member states than many of the other
IOs produced from the post-World War II international system.112 The
United Nations recognized the Olympic Truce and in 2014 the two
signed an agreement to work together at their highest levels toward their
shared goals.113 The IOC also has a higher profile than many of the IOs
that have more to do with managing the day-to-day business of their
respective sports.114
Despite its stated non-political nature, the IOC, and, so too the
Olympic Games they manage, are often interpreted as political. It is a
non-governmental organization to be sure, but one whose membership
is based on nationality, and whose product is based on the competition
among nations.115 The IOC’s adherence to this apolitical notion has led
111. A JSTOR search for the IOC and FIFA represented in the leading political
science journal, International Organization, on this topic returns 52 results over the
past fifty years. Many of these results only reference sport and these organizations in
relation to some other topic like international law.
112. The IOC was formed in 1894 and list 206 nations as members. See Yannick
Kluch & Eli Wolff, What’s the IOC—and Why Doesn’t it Do More About Human
Rights Issues Related to the Olympics?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 18, 2022),
https://theconversation.com/whats-the-ioc-and-why-doesnt-it-do-more-abouthuman-rights-issues-related-to-the-olympics-176499. FIFA was formed in 1904 and
recognizes 211 nations as their members. See FIFA Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 5, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/13/world/fifa-fast-facts/index.html.
113. See G.A. Res. A/69/L.5, Sports as a Means to Promote Education, Health,
Development and Peace (Oct. 16, 2014).
114. Compare the IOC with FIBA, or the International Federation of Basketball
for context. This latter organization organizes international and regional competitions,
maintains a world ranking of its over 200 members, and has a regularized calendar
ending with a World Cup every four years. See About Us, FIBA,
https://www.fiba.basketball/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2022). The highest level of
international competition, and de facto world championship, remains the Olympic
Summer Games. See Olympic Games, INT’L OLYMPICS COMM.,
https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games (last visited Mar. 7, 2022). Perhaps only
FIFA can lay claim to its quadrennial World Cup superseding the Olympic final in
importance. About FIFA, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa (last visited Mar. 7,
2022).
115. See Efthalia Chatzigianni, The IOC as an International Organization, 2
SPORT MGMT. INT’L J. 91, 94-95 (2006) (for a straight forward argument to this end).
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to its presenting a contradictory image. On the one hand, it discourages
explicit acts of political protest, while, on the other, it reinforces status
quo politics by legitimizing regimes through state-centric rituals like
the medal presentation with national anthems and flags.116 It is the host
selection process through which the IOC has historically maintained
much of its prestige and influence.
The right to host an Olympic Games is awarded through a long bid
process that, for determined aspirants, will include what is in effect a
“practice” bid destined to fail.117 The competition has been historically
incredibly competitive, and stories of foul play surrounding bids is, if
not always known in detail, certainly familiar in anecdotes.118 Bribes
for votes and sweetheart deals are commonly suspected, and in certain
cases have been considered pro forma behaviors for would-be hosts.119
The desire to win a bid and gain the previously discussed marker of
international legitimacy, is certainly demonstrated by the willingness to
cheat or engage in subterfuge.
As discussed below, there has been a trend of potential hosts
backing out, often at the end of a public referendum on the matter.120
116. Sean Ingle, IOC Bans Athletes From Taking a Knee and Podium Protests
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
21,
2021),
at
Tokyo
Olympics,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/apr/21/podium-protests-to-be-banned-attokyo-olympics-after-athletes-poll.
117. There are a number of histories and examinations of the bid process that
discuss either the political or economic consequences. See, e.g., M. BURBANK, ET AL.,
OLYMPIC DREAMS: THE IMPACT OF MEGA-EVENTS ON LOCAL POLITICS (Lynne
Rienner Publishers ed., 2001); C. R. HILL, OLYMPIC POLITICS (Manchester Univ.
Press ed., 1992); RICHARD ESPY, THE POLITICS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES: WITH AN
EPILOGUE, 1976-1980 (Univ. of Calif. Press ed., 1981).
118. Salt Lake City’s 2002 Winter Games bid behavior is again today being
discussed as that city preps for a bid for a potential second event. See, e.g., Brady
McCombs, Salt Lake City’s new Olympic bid comes after scandal’s lessons, LAS
VEGAS REV. J. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nation-andworld/salt-lake-citys-new-olympics-bid-comes-after-scandals-lessons-1554309/.
119. The Nagano bid committee was convinced that these behaviors were just
part of the process as they were the very same behaviors they had observed by other
hosts in previous bid cycles. See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, Nagano Burned
Documents Tracing ‘98 Olympics Bid, WASH. POST FOREIGN SERV. (Jan. 21, 1999),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/digest/daily/jan99/nagano21.htm.
120. Vivienne Walt, The Biggest Olympics Hurdle: Finding Host Cities,
FORTUNE (May 22, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/05/22/the-biggest-olympicshurdle-finding-host-cities/.
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This has been especially prevalent after the Great Recession of 2008
when policies of austerity developed. Suffice to say here that the bid
process pits actors against one another in a competition for what is in
effect a private good; that is, it is rival and excludable. The right to host
cannot be divided, and the benefits of hosting accrue solely to the
host.121 These benefits exist because the Games themselves are, in a
sense, a public good; non-rival and non-excludable for all to enjoy. This
competition has shaped the political life of the IOC to be sure, and
where it gains much of its influence over states.
A. The Politics of the International Olympic Committee
The familiar arguments about mega-sporting events (especially the
Olympics) value to hosts need not be repeated in full here. While some
scholars have summarily found these events result in a financial loss for
the hosts,122 in terms of soft power these events typically do provide a
measurable incentive.123 Soft power, the measure of a state’s ability to
get other states to do what it wants without the use of coercion,124 is
often an explicit goal of bid cities. After London hosted the 2012
Summer Games, there was a noticeable increase in people’s positive
perception of the United Kingdom; a stated goal that nation had sought
to achieve via a strategy of “engagement” through the Games.125
Anecdotally, when the present author has had the opportunity to speak
121. Hosts may be multiple actors, such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup. See FIFA
World
Cup
2026,
FIFA,
https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/canadamexicousa2026,
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2022). The right to host cannot be divided. Therefore, while
traditionally bids and hosts have been one nation or city in the past, it is not
inconceivable (and in fact more likely in the future) that a bid will spread duties across
multiple hosts, but the rights in essence remain singular; confined to the bid as
designed. See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 6, art. 33-34.
122. R. A. Baade & V. A. Matheson, Going for the Gold: The Economics of the
Olympics, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 204 (2016).
123. Jonathan Grix, Sport Politics and the Olympics, 11 POL. STUD. REV. 15, 17
(2013).
124. Joseph S. Nye, Public Policy and Soft Power, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 94, 95 (2008).
125. B. Houlihan & R. Giulianatti, Politics and the London 2012 Olympics: The
(In)security Games, 88 INT’L AFFS. 701, 716 (2012); Y. W. Li, Public Diplomacy
Strategies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2012 London Olympics: A
Comprehensive Study, 30 INT’L J. OF THE HIST. OF SPORT 1723 (2013).
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with Canadians, they will assert, to this day, that the 1984 Calgary
Winter Games put that city on the international map, and many
supported that city’s flirtations with a second bid.126
One might assume that a bid indicates a regime’s desire to host, and
that a successful bid is the fulfillment of this desire irrespective of the
actual events final balance of payments. Although this logic seems
obvious enough, it is often lost in the discourse that a regime’s goal
when bidding might not be material, economic gains or infrastructure
expansion, and something less tangible. For instance, Tokyo, Japan,
Summer 2020 hosts, initially bid for the 2016 Games. They did so in a
time that China’s ascendency was on full display thanks in part to the
2008 Beijing Games. Japan, as a nation, was “[anxious] about the
political and economic challenge of its rival East Asian superpower.”127
The Olympics were thought to be a way to reassert Tokyo, and Japan’s,
place in that region and in the world.
That the Olympics have always been characterized as non-political
denies a long history of preferential treatment of formal states. Despite
their worst behaviors, a sitting government was taken to be legitimate
and thus a worthy participant in the Olympic Movement. The 1936
Berlin Games for instance, as well as the previously noted awarding of
the 1940 Games to Tokyo, followed by the IOC’s acceptance of
Germany as the potential replacement host for the 1940 Games when
Tokyo backed out,128 as well as the planned 1944 Cortina d’Ampezzo
126. Kaylen Small, Why Insider Says 2026 Olympics Wouldn’t Have Been a
NEWS
(June
24,
2019),
Good
Fit
for
Calgary,
GLOB.
https://globalnews.ca/news/5426773/2026-olympics-host-italy-ioc-calgary-roblivingstone/ (e.g., There is an interesting geographic difference when discussing
Canada and hosting the Olympics. While those from the west of Canada are
commonly pointing to the Calgary (1984) and Vancouver (2010) Winter Games as
examples of hosting’s benefits for the nation. Toronto in the east has struggled for
years to gain popular support for a Summer Olympic bid and has a long history of
anti-Olympic social movements. Yet, Torontans seemed more passive when the
present author was shown construction in 2014 for the Pan-American Games that were
to occur in 2015).
127. William W. Kelley, Asia Pride, China Fears, Tokyo Anxiety: Japan Looks
Back at 2008 Beijing and Forward to 2012 London and 2016 Tokyo, 7 ASIA-PAC. J.
4 (2009).
128. Under the hosting arrangement of the time, the Winter and Summer Games
were held in the same year with the Winter preceding the Summer Games. The
proposed solution to Tokyo’s abandonment was to return to Garmisch-Partenkirchen,
Germany for the Winter Games which would have been hosted there in 1936. The
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Games in Mussolini’s Italy were all examples of hosts whose
international behaviors were counter the Olympic Truce and its pacific
mission.129
The IOC and the Olympic Games were started in Europe by a
French nobleman whose ideals were universal in rhetoric only, while
practically reinforcing the centrality of Europe and in the world
order.130 Initially, there was no interest in making the Games truly
global. The early example of the Anthropology Days that the 1904 hosts
(St. Louis, USA) attached to them demonstrated the organizers’
antipathy to much of the non-European world.131 Tokyo’s initial
selection to host the abandoned 1940 Games would have marked the
first non-Western host. The 1956 Games would leave the Northern
Hemisphere, but for the former British colony of Australia. It would not
be until 1964 that a non-European, non-Western nation, Japan, would
host the Games.132
Had it not been for grassroot efforts to impress the issue upon the
powers that be, it might never have been that the IOC would bar

Summer Games would then be hosted by Helsinki, Finland. See Gillian Brockell, This
Isn’t the First Time Olympics in Japan have been Disrupted, WASH. POST (Mar. 24,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/03/24/1940-tokyo-olympicspostponed-coronavirus/.
129. Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia (then known as Abyssinia) was viewed
as an act of aggression and a violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It had also tested
the bounds of what the international community, through the League of Nations,
would tolerate. Each of these Games would be abandoned due to the outbreak of
World War II as well as the 1940 Games. See Ethiopia: Lesson in War, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (July 16, 1935), https://newrepublic.com/article/90604/ethiopia-lesson-inwar; See also U.N. and the Olympic Truce, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/en/olympictruce (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
130. Who Was Pierre De Coubertin?, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM.,
https://olympics.com/ioc/faq/history-and-origin-of-the-games/who-was-pierre-decoubertin (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
131. The 1904 Games are widely believed to be the worst Olympics of all time.
Few participant nations and the Games produced as a side show to the concurrent
World’s Fair, the Anthropology Days and its racist overtones would seemingly
confirm this opinion. See THE HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE MODERN OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT (John E. Findling & Kimberly D. Pelle eds., 1996) (for a summary of the
event).
132. Brockell, supra note 128.
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apartheid South African participation from 1964 until 1992.133 It
eventually did so based on inequal participation among white and Black
South Africans in sport. That the inclusion of seven non-whites on their
Olympic team was ignored by the IOC reaffirmed that this had more to
do with superficial participation and struck at the heart of the cause of
such inequality.134
The Olympic Charter, which is routinely updated, and a state’s
adherence to it is the bedrock of participation and the Olympic
Movement. 135 Sport as a human right and equal access to sport being
the raison d’etre of the entire Olympic institution, when a state like
South Africa cannot ensure equal participation for all citizens no matter
their skin color, we might suspect the conclusion a simple one. Yet, the
IOC was slow to adopt the South African ban, and then it had to
overcome the centrality of white, European hegemony to its executive
structure.136 It was not uncommon for the familiar refrain “politics
should not be allowed to interfere with sport” to be used in defense of
IOC inactivity on this issue as it commonly is.137 As observers noted at
the time, South Africa had already politicized sport when it segregated
it based on race.138
By arguing that sport was non-political, it separated the IOC from
the responsibilities of encouraging the adoption of contemporary norms
regarding the equality of people and treatment due them. It was, in
essence, saying that sport, and that which defined its function, was
inherently above politics, and thus it could not engage in the apartheid
discourse without corrupting sport. External pressure eventually won
133. Olympics; Ban Asked on All Athletes Competing in South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/10/sports/olympics-banasked-on-all-athletes-competing-in-south-africa.html.
134. 1964: South Africa Banned from Olympics, BBC (Aug. 18, 1964),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/18/newsid_3547000/354787
2.stm. See ERIC P. LOUW, THE RISE, FALL, AND LEGACY OF APARTHEID (Westport,
Conn: Praeger ed., 2004) (for a general history of apartheid in South Africa).
135. The present Charter was enacted on August 8, 2021. See OLYMPIC
CHARTER, supra note 6.
136. R. E. Lapchick, The Olympic Movement and Racism: An Analysis in
Historical Perspective. 17 AFRICA TODAY 14, 14-16 (1970).
137. Jim Bouton, South Africa’s Membership in the International Olympic
Committee, 15 AFR. TODAY 3, 3 (1968).
138. Id. at 3.
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out and the IOC did ban the South African participation at its events.139
As more and more actors began to take part in the Olympic Movement,
it was harder for Euro-centrality to be maintained as other viewpoints
would need be incorporated into IOC behaviors. Even so, much of the
prospective influence the IOC could have exerted on states would be
diluted by a growing emphasis on its corporate relations and the
Olympics as a commodity; its most recent functional form. This has
been the particular mode by which the Games have been understood in
the post-Cold War era.
B. The Business of the International Olympic Committee
While the Olympics, and other mega-sporting events like the FIFA
World Cup, are apt to advertise an idealized image of a nation or region,
they are also ready-made to advertise for some of the world’s largest
multi-national corporations (MNCs).140 This has made them especially
attractive to cities with an eye to post-globalized economic
development.141 Since the 1992 Games of Barcelona, television
audiences have only increased, and so too, television revenue and the
opportunities for corporate sponsorship.142 This increased attention is
precisely why MNCs, like the Coca-Cola Company and AnheuserBusch InBev, seek sponsorship opportunities in relation to these events.
These companies face competition, not just in their domestic market,
but also in the international markets.143 The use of the Olympic logo in
association with their brand, the reward for sponsoring the Olympics,
can transfer the Games’ popularity to a corporation,144 as well as signal
a brand’s superiority over its competitors.145
139. Lapchick, supra note 136, at 16.
140. Rama Yelkur et. al, The Alchemy of Olympics Advertising & Sponsorship:
Turning the Games into Gold, 13 J. MGMT. POL’Y & PRAC. 34, 35 (2012).
141. Nandwani, supra note 12.
142. David Whitson & John Horne, Underestimated Costs and Overestimated
Benefits? Comparing the Outcomes of Sports Mega-events in Canada and Japan, 54
SOCIO. REV. 73, 75 (2006).
143. Brenda J. Ponsford & Jagdish Agrawal, Why Corporations Sponsor the
Olympics, 5 J. PROMOTION MGMT. 15, 22 (1999).
144. Thade Dudzik & Andrea Groppel-Klein, The Efficiency of Integrated
Sponsorship Advertising, 7 INT’L J. SPORTS MKTG & SPONSORSHIP 51, 59 (2005).
145. Ponsford & Agrawal, supra note 143, at 24.
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Ponsford and Agrawal write that “[i]t is possible that repeated
pairing of the company or brand with the image represented by the
Olympics causes transfer of this image from the Olympics to the
sponsoring firm or brand.”146 Following the 1985 introduction of
TOP,147 the IOC was able to provide corporations with a global, mediafriendly platform and product/brand exclusivity.148 While TOP
members tend to be dominated by the largest, western MNCs,
corporations within the host nation have an opportunity for preferential
exclusivity within many of the same categories. For instance, while
Anheuser-Busch InBev has been a long-time sponsor enjoying
exclusivity in the beer category, Chinese brewers Tsingtao were given
branding rights for the duration of the 2008 events.149
Scholars like Preuss, Gemeinder, and Seguin and Piatkowska, and
Zysko have documented the growth of Olympic revenue under this
program as well as the increased incentives to “ambush” an event.150
That is, to try and attach a brand to an event although one cannot afford
or does not want to pay the associated fees. For some time, the Olympic
“brand” had been infallible, and the Olympic symbol of the five
interlocked rings is the most recognized non-written logo across the

146. Id. at 22.
147. TOP is short for “The Olympic Partner” Programme which denudes it of
its commercial nature. Whether a strategic decision to obfuscate the aggressive,
commodification of the Games or as a result of an uninspired creative process remains
unknown, See What is the TOP Programme, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM.,
https://olympics.com/ioc/faq/olympic-marketing/what-is-the-topprogramme#:~:text=The%20abbreviation%20%E2%80%9CTOP%E2%80%9D%20
stands%20for,OCOGs)%20and%20the%20Olympic%20Movement (last visited
Mar. 7, 2022).
148. Michael C. Hall, Urban Entrepreneurship, Corporate Interests and Sports
Mega-events: The Thin Policies of Competitiveness within the Hard Outcomes of
Neoliberalism, 54 SOCIO. REV. 59, 59-60 (2006).
149. China: Olympics Help Tsingtao Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/business/worldbusiness/20fobriefsOLYMPICSHELP_BRF.html.
150. Holger Preuss, Kai Gemeinder, Kai, & Benoit Seguin, Ambush Marketing
in China: Counterbalancing Olympic Sponsorship Efforts, 7 ASIAN BUS. & MGMT,
243 (2008); Monica Piatkowska & Jolanta Zysko, Off-field Competition at Major
Sport Events: Case Study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa, 49 PHYSICAL
CULTURE & SPORTS STUD. RSCH. 118 (2010).
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world.151 Although the commercialization of the Games was not always
popular, it had at least always been profitable.
This sort of advertising and branding, both for the national and
commercial goals of a regime, cannot be generated by many, if arguably
any, other means. Yet, there are also reputational risks that a host state
takes on with the increased attention. For instance, Ukraine’s 2012
cohosting of the UEFA European Championships resulted in negative
publicity regarding that state’s troubles with racism.152 In the case of
Beijing, 2008, protests that preceded the Games highlighted the PRC’s
poor treatment of Tibetans.153 At the same time, these events provide a
source for increased attention the state can use to advance its aims. This
same attention could also be used by activists and dissidents to get their
messages out. Then, instead of one unified message about the host
emerging from the event, competing views would be available to the
event’s audience.
This strategic use of the increased media on the part of NGOs
would in effect be naming and shaming.154 This is a tactic by which
they can globally publicize state behavior that violates expected human
rights norms.155 The government faces a call to change this behavior
from the domestic NGOs and international actors who likewise
advocate for change. This is referred to as the “Boomerang Pattern” and
it pressures the government to change through actors from “above” (at
the international level) and “below” (at the domestic level).156
The increased global attention of the event could give a domestic
NGO the opportunity to capture the attention of the world in a crowded
advocacy market.157 One of the key players emerging in the post-Cold
151. HANS WESTERBEEK & AARON SMITH, SPORTS BUSINESS IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE 26 (Palgrave Macmillan ed., 1st ed. 2002). Whether this assertion is
still true, or the results of this survey robust, should be kept in mind.
152. Grix, supra note 123, at 18-19.
153. Anthee Carassava, Tibet Protest at Olympic Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/30cnd-greece.html.
154. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the
Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORGS. 689, 689-90 (2008).
155. Id.
156. Margaret P. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks
in International and Regional Politics, 51 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 89, 93 (1999).
157. CLIFFORD BOB, THE MARKETING OF REBELLION: INSURGENTS, MEDIA,
AND INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2005); Amanda M.
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War system have been trans-national advocacy networks (TANs),
which exchange information and regularize communication in an issue
area.158 Groups utilizing this attention could insert themselves into
existing TANs, and increase their ability to effect change. Yet TANs
are not categorically exhaustive when it comes to issue areas,159 and the
presence of the world’s media could raise issues to the international
agenda, creating new TANs that would otherwise be overlooked.
ISOs like the IOC, the host, and the sponsoring MNCs are keen to
keep these events as sanitized of political controversy as possible.160
Yet, there have been arguments that awarding poor observers of human
rights international sporting events can validate these state’s policies.161
Since 2014 and the Winter Games in Sochi, Russia, the IOC has been
proactive in trying to quiet protests by athletes.162 This has been
interpreted as the IOC giving a host regime political cover. It might also
be that the IOC would rather not associate event sponsors with “bad
press” as “sponsors advertise their sponsorship well in advance of the
Olympics as well as advertising heavily during the games
themselves.”163 This suggests the brand transference could actually
provide the sponsor with a negative image in line with the host’s
politics.
As an increasing number of potential hosts withdraw from the
games and the leverage the IOC maintains over states through the bid
process diminishes, the likelihood of the IOC’s treatment of the
Murdie, The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights International
Nongovernmental Organizations, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI., 1, 4 (2014).
158. Keck & Sikkink, supra note 156, at 191.
159. Charli R. Carpenter, Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and
the Paradox of Weapons Norms, 65 INT’L ORG. 69, 69-70 (2011).
160. Michelle Bruton, IOC President Thomas Bach: Olympics ‘Are Not About
Politics,’ Athletes Should Be Politically Neutral At Games, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michellebruton/2020/10/26/ioc-president-thomasbach-olympics-are-not-about-politics-athletes-should-be-politically-neutral-atgames/?sh=3ca3461479d8.
161. Chad Nold, Olympic sized opportunity: Examining the IOC’s past neglect
of human rights in host cities and the chance to encourage reform on a global scale,
11 LOY. UNIV. CHI. INT’ L. REV. 161, 172 (2014).
162. Karolos Grohmann, Sochi Sets Up Protest Zones in City: IOC, REUTERS
(Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-sochi-protests/sochisets-up-protest-zones-in-city-ioc-idUSBRE9B90UV20131210.
163. Ponsford & Agrawal, supra note 143, at 23.
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Olympics as a commodity should rise. It will need to replace the rents
accrued through the bid process with the rents it may extract from the
final event. This is indicated by the fact that the IOC has sealed hosts
for the Summer Games through 2032,164 in addition to hosts for both
the 2024 and 2028. Ensuring the occurrence of the events themselves,
neither the quality nor the universality of their selection are guaranteed,
this secures the IOC functionally. It may now capture the windfall from
ensuing TV rights and sponsorship deals. Surely the three hosts
selected, all cities in western states, demonstrates the IOC’s further
desire to reduce any potential criticisms it could face.
C. The International Olympic Committee as Institutional Law Maker
Hosting is admittedly a rarity for any one nation, and very few
nations have captured the lion’s share of events. Still, a state and its
regime benefits from participation in the games. There is “more
political capital to be gained by attending” than boycotting or abstaining
from participating in the Games.165 It has been argued that “interstate
diplomacy has generally become more subtle and more concerned with
the promotion of a nation’s… image.”166 Maintaining a state’s
participation in the Olympic Movement then requires continued
acquiescence to the international sporting regime, at the top of which
sits the IOC.
The reconciliation of sporting calendars, rules regarding
amateurism,167 and membership within recognized IOs aside, the latter
period of the Olympic Movement has recognized an acceptance of the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the World Anti-Doping
Agency (WADA) as legitimate. When a state accepts these bodies and
their activities, they are demonstrating an “acceptance of the IOC’s
supremacy in the international sports order [such that] domestic courts
164. In order: Paris, France; Los Angeles, United States; Brisbane, Australia.
See Shana McCarriston, Where is the next Olympics? Explaining where the Summer
and Winter Games will be held through 2032, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 21, 2022),
https://www.cbssports.com/olympics/news/where-is-the-next-olympics-explainingwhere-the-summer-and-winter-games-will-be-held-through-2032/.
165. Houlihan & Giulinatti, supra note 125, at 703.
166. Id.
167. This has largely been devolved to the various IOs to be decided
independently.
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usually refrain from granting legal protection against punitive decisions
of organs of the IOC, for example a prohibition from participating in
the Olympic Games.”168 Perhaps this has been most notable in the
Russian doping-ban and WADA’s role within the process.169 Despite
the debate on CAS’s reputation in the international sports regime, it is
often described as an efficient and objective player in the international
sports regime.170
Why do states and other international actors accept the legitimacy,
and the finality of, the actions and decisions of these two bodies? It has
been argued that the International Labor Organization (ILO) has
encouraged greater legalization of international labor through its
activities.171 By upholding labor rights as laws, it reinforced this belief
among its members. Accordingly, many regional organizations and
other treaty bodies have begun adopting the language of labor rights
into their agreements.172 Therefore, the IOC can occupy a similar role
in the context of the international sporting regime as its activities
reinforce the norms and behaviors that eventually give the CAS or
WADA a legal character.
What of issues outside of sport? Can or should the IOC affect these
issue areas as well? As noted in the earlier discussion of the South
African sporting ban, the IOC was able to effectively bridge apartheid
and sport.173 So we might expect that where this can be done, the IOC

168. Nowrot, supra note 60, at 599.
169. Tariq Panja, Russia Banned From the Olympics and Global Sports for 4
TIMES
(Dec.
9,
2019),
Years
Over
Doping,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/sports/russia-doping-ban.html. Although, the
bad and who it was meant to affect was never clear. For instance, many Russian
athletes were still present at the Tokyo Games. See Why are Russian athletes
competing at the Tokyo Olympics despite the country’s ban?, THE ECONOMIST (Jul.
28, 2021), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/07/28/why-arerussian-athletes-competing-at-the-tokyo-olympics-despite-the-countrys-ban.
170. Louise Reilly, Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) &
the Role of National Courts in International Sports Disputes, an symposium, 2012 J.
DISP. RESOL. 63, 80 (2012).
171. Deak, supra note 75, at 26.
172. Id.
173. 1964: South African Banned from the Olympics, BBC NEWS (Aug. 18,
1964),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/18/newsid_3547000/354787
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would be more amenable to taking up certain issues. For instance, the
2014 categorical inclusion of sexual orientation in the Olympic
Charter’s non-discrimination policy would suggest that it could ban the
participation of states from the Movement on the basis of their conduct
towards homosexual citizens.174
Likewise, it might be suspected that the same would be the case for
states who violate international labor laws and, in particular, the
freedom of assembly and the right to collectively bargain. Decent work
and sustainable production, the sustainable development goals
reconciled to the IOC’s Agenda 2020+5, would imply a recognition of
non-exploitative labor as well as the right to employment.175 The
language in the Olympic Charter regarding “human dignity” and the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
would suggest a longer-term obligation than those established by the
Agenda.176 This is an especially sensitive topic, if not always salient, to
the Olympic Movement whose increasing costs drive hosts to search for
cheaper and cheaper labor.
III. INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
The 2008 Beijing Olympics were instructive in demonstrating the
impetus for this transition and how the Games would endure some
twenty years beyond the end of the Cold War. The People’s Republic
2.stm. See ERIC P. LOUW, THE RISE, FALL, AND LEGACY OF APARTHEID (Praeger ed.,
2004) (for a general history of apartheid in South Africa).
174. Notably, this came after the outcry caused by the Russians’ human rights
record and domestic laws affecting the LBGTQ+ community in that country. See
Owen Gibson, Olympic Anti-discrimination Clause Introduced After Sochi Gay
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
25,
2014),
Rights
Row,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/sep/25/olympic-anti-discrimination-clausesochi-gay-rights-row.
175. The rhetoric surrounding sustainable production reconciles the
environmental and employment aspects of adapting modes of production.
Historically, one of the greatest threats of the environmental movement (real or
otherwise) was what it would do to traditional jobs. Hence, environmental dialogues
tend to include an explicit understanding of continued employment with little to no
disruption within traditional economic sectors. See SHANTZ, J., GREEN SYNDICALISM:
AN ALTERNATIVE RED-GREEN VISION 47 (Syracuse Univ. Press ed., 2017).
176. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 6.
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of China’s bid on the 2008 Games. As with most states, they did so with
an eye on positively utilizing the increased attention.177 Not only would
the 2008 Games be a triumphant display of the nation and its advancing
progress in economic and world power, but it would also serve as
redemption for the failed 2000 Games bid.178 That bid made the IOC’s
voting members uneasy, as it was placed barely two years following the
incidents at Tiananmen Square.179 This latest effort included foreign
designed stadia, a bid film by oft-maligned Chinese filmmaker, Zhang
Yimou, and a promise to increase media freedoms.180 These efforts
would successfully win Beijing the bid, but it would also lead to
increases in the number of domestic rights advocates disseminating
information regarding the PRC’s human rights violations.181 In March
of 2008, protests ostensibly tied to the treatment of monks during a
religious ceremony by the police erupted in Tibet and were soon
accompanied by demands for independence.182 Internet images of the
PRC’s response to these protests quickly spread across the world, and
on sites specially created to tie into the Olympics.183
177. Dong Jinxia and James A. Mangan, Beijing Olympics Legacy: Certain
Intentions and Certian and Uncertain Outcomes, in OLYMPIC LEGACIES: INTENDED
AND UNINTENDED 136 (Routledge ed., 2010); Holger Preuss & Christian Alfs,
Signaling Through the 2008 Beijing Olympics—Using Mega Sports Events to Change
the Perception and Image of the Host, 11 EURO. SPORT MGMT. Q., 55, 66 (2011).
178. Alan Riding, Olympics; 2000 Olympics Go to Sydney In Surprise Setback
for
China,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
24,
1993),
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/24/sports/olympics-2000-olympics-go-tosydney-in-surprise-setback-for-china.html.
179. China: Free Tiananmen Prisoners Before Olympics, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Jun. 2, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/02/china-free-tiananmenprisoners-olympics.
180. Jinxia and Mangan, supra note 177, at 144; Ryan Ong, New Beijing, Great
Olympics: Beijing and its Unfolding Olympic Legacy, 4 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 35, 49
(2004); Xuefei Ren, Architecture and nation building in the age of globalization:
construction of the National Stadium of Beijing for the 2008 Olympics, 30 J. OF
URBAN AFFAIRS 175, 176 (2004).
181. Jim Yardley, Violence in Tibet as Monks Clash With the Police, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/world/asia/15tibet.html.
182. Id.
183. Kelsang Dolma, The IOC Should Stop Lying to Itself About the Beijing
Olympics, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 1, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/01/theioc-should-stop-lying-to-itself-about-the-beijing-olympics/.
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Students for a Free Tibet and protests at the torch relay linked the
Games and the protests, and garnered international attention.184 The
IOC caught wind of the negative publicity and tried in vain to have
videos of the protests removed from YouTube, fearing the harm that
this sort of publicity could cause the Games.185 The protest began just
as the torch relay was set to start its world tour, and as it reached cities
like London and San Francisco. The participants were met with an often
hostile crowd in their reception.186 This was certainly not the kind of
publicity the Chinese government and IOC had hoped for, nor was it
likely the manner of publicity the event’s sponsors and corporate
partners had envisioned.
That the IOC found itself in this less than ideal position might be
considered a self-inflicted wound. Afterall, China was selected by the
IOC over the likes of Toronto, Paris, and Osaka—all safe bets in states
with a notable history of hosting mega-events.187 There was another
underlying aspect to these Games that was often lost in the tumult of
the protests, and that was China’s treatment of its migrant laborers.
These were individuals who migrated from the rural west of China in
search of work in the burgeoning metropolitan areas. Organizations like
the International Trade Unions Federation directly addressed the IOC
as complicit in its disregard of the issue.188 The issue has a long standing
history rather than being a cursory reaction to the 2008 Games.

184. Robert Barnett, The Tibet Protests of Spring, 2008: Conflict between the
Nation and the State, 3 CHINA PERSP, 6 (2009); Jonathan Watts, Beijing Locks Down
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
16,
2008),
Lhasa
as
Crisis
Grows,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/16/tibet.china.
185. Stephanie Condon, Olympic Committee Rethinks Copyright Infringement
Claim on YouTube, CNET (Aug. 15, 2008), https://www.cnet.com/news/olympiccommittee-rethinks-copyright-infringement-claim-on-youtube/.
186. John F. Burns, Protests of China Make Olympic Torch Relay an Obstacle
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2008),
Course,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/world/europe/07torch.html; Austin Ramzy,
China’s View of the Olympic Torch War, TIME (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1729169,00.html.
187. World Reacts to U.S. Torture Report, CNN (July 13, 2001),
https://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/13/beijing.win.rivals/.
188. Olympics: IOC Inaction on Labour Rights Shameful, ITUF (Apr. 8, 2008),
https://www.ituc-csi.org/olympics-ioc-inaction-on-labour.
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A. The Household Registration System and Labor Migration in China
The PRC has, since 1958, made use of the Household Registration
System (hokou) to identify its citizens as rural, agricultural laborers, or
urban, non-agricultural laborers.189 Effectively, this classification
created a duality within the Chinese citizenry, as the urban residents
enjoyed an “iron rice bowl” attributable to regular and steady
employment, while the rural populations found themselves left behind
by economic modernization schemes.190 This outcome was exacerbated
by the actions of the central government in Beijing in further devolving
authority, particularly fiscal, to local governments.191 Far from secure
in their day-to-day lives, many rural citizens found their existence
precariously balanced between the nationally changing economic
sectors and the austerity policies promoted locally.
The policy served several purposes, but particularly to the present
interests in labor rights, it managed urban (un)employment numbers.192
While higher unemployment can be a threat to governments of all types,
the unemployed may act as the vanguard of revolution for
autocracies.193 A priority would be keeping urban unemployment low
by way of restricting the rural to urban migration pattern. This was a
means to manage the costs of state welfare programs which were more
generously offered to urban, non-agricultural workers.194
Under Deng Xiaoping, reforms to the system began to redress some
of the differences between rural and urban citizens. Migration became
less difficult with the availability of permits for rural laborers to
temporarily live and work in these urban areas.195 However, the system
189. See Tiejun Cheng & Mark Seldon, The Origins and Social Consequences
of China’s Hukou System, 1994 CHINA Q. 644, 652 (1994) (for a discussion about the
wider implications of the system).
190. Li Jing, China’s New Labor Contract Law and Protection of Workers, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1083, 1087 (2009).
191. Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism,
Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL.
50, 81 (1995).
192. Cheng & Seldon, supra note 189, at 646.
193.
See Joyce Sween & Remi Clignet. Urban Unemployment as a
Determinant of Political Unrest: The Cast Study of Douala Cameroon, 3 CANADIAN
J. AFR. STUD. 3 (1969).
194. Cheng & Seldon, supra note 189, at 661-662.
195. See Cheng & Seldon, supra note 189, at 651.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

39

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 [], Art. 6

462 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
maintained much of its inherent antagonism towards rural citizens. As
China’s economy became more industrial-minded and focused on the
export of goods, a “floating population” (lindong renkou) of migrant
laborers, who were attracted to the higher wage differentials of the city
as well as the greater availability of services, were convinced to leave
the rural west of China for its developing east.196 They were seeking “to
broaden their horizons and experience a modern life” as well as enjoy
“cosmopolitan consumption.”197
Often these individual moves were temporary, with these migrants
eventually returning to their homes so as to maintain and claim
possession of their lands.198 Yet the continuous presence of a mobile
population was too wrought with constant worry. Particularly, the
varying systems of services for rural and urban populations operated to
reward the latter often at the expense of the former.199 Were this mobile
population to become discontented, it may well signal trouble for the
regime. In response to these mounting concerns, the PRC initiated a
series of labor law reforms to address the different experiences of rural
laborers to those of their urban counterparts.200
The first efforts to improve the migrant laborers’ plight emerged in
1994 following a series of labor protests.201 In the wake of the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests, the PRC was sensitive to both large-scale
demonstrations as well as international critiques of its response to
them.202 This was during a time when casual or informal labor was
expanding in response to a growing need for Chinese industry to
196. Id.
197. Jenny Chan & Mark Seldon, The Labour Politics of China’s Rural Migrant
259,
261
(2016),
Workers,
14
GLOBALIZATIONS
https://www.responsibleglobalvaluechains.org/images/PDF/Jenny-Chan—MarkSelden_The-Labour-Politics-of-Chinas-Rural-Migrant.pdf.
198. Hare, supra note 86 at 49.
199. See Cheng & Seldon, supra note 189, at 660. As Cheng and Seldon wrote,
the PRC assumed “farmers produced grain for self-consumption and hence had little
need for access to” state subsidized food rations. It was thus common for urban
residents to move to the countryside during times of famine and doubly burden the
rural infrastructure.
200. Id. at 663.
201. See Eli Friedman & Ching Kwan Lee, Remaking the World of Chinese
Labour: A 30-Year Retrospective, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 507, 518-519 (2010).
202. China’s View of the Olympic Torch War, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48445934.
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maintain a competitive economic position internationally.203 By acting
to take advantage of a labor surplus, Chinese industrial hubs were able
to attract and offer foreign investors a cheap base of operations.204 At
the same time, the ability to shed labor during economic downturns
functioned to protect these industries’ competitiveness. Thus, there was
a heavy reliance on flexible employer-employee relations.
The 1994 law introduced contracts into this relation, but there were
no protections from discrimination based on household registry.205
While keeping the PRC’s economy humming to its benefit, the law did
little to protect and defend the inherently vulnerable migrant laborers.
The decentralization of both labor regulation and fiscal policy to the
authority of local governments resulted in a weakening of the few
protections these laborers had.206 The regime’s goal aimed to reserve
urban employment for urban citizens who had found themselves laid
off, and these efforts further restricted the movement of migrants.207
After a spate of protests in 2007, the PRC would once again address
its labor laws. Yet this time, the PRC would pass the Labor Contract
Law which would go into effect on January 1 of 2008—the same year
as the Beijing Summer Games.208 This law was created with the aim to
increase protections for migrant workers by ending fixed term contracts
(which were thought to increase worker agency in selecting
employment) and to increase the benefits to advantage migrant
laborers.209
The unfortunate reality of migrant life was only marginally
improved. By 2011, a majority of migrant laborers remained informally
employed.210 This was a result of the “[n]oncompliance with existing
labor laws and regulations” compounded “with a lack of supervision
and enforcement on the part of the state.”211 Further, “most private firms
203. Montinola, Qian & Weingast, supra note 191, at 75-76.
204. Id.
205. See Jing, supra note 190, at 1089.
206. Id. at 1088-89.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1084-85.
209. Id. at 1114-15.
210. Xiaobo Zhang, Jin Yang, & Shenglin Wang, China Has Reached the Lewis
Turning Point, 22 CHINA ECON. REV. 178, 180 (2011).
211. Jing, supra note 190, at 1101.
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refuse to allow [migrant laborers] to exercise their social security
rights” with little impetus from the local governments to do so.212 The
lack of enforcement of these laws would mean localities were able to
keep labor cheap and attractive to foreign investors. They would
become self-sufficient with no need to seek relief from the central
government.213 Into this setting the IOC and Summer Olympics arrived.
B. The International Olympic Committee and China
In a 2008 report on the abuse of migrant workers, Human Rights
Watch’s Asia advocacy director, Sophie Richardson stated:
If the Olympic movement really prides itself on its dedication to
‘fundamental universal ethical principles,’ then the International
Olympics Committee must ensure that workers who help build
Beijing’s Olympic venues are at least treated fairly and in accordance
with Chinese law, and the fundamental international human rights
standards that China has assumed and promised its citizens to
respect.214

The report notes that six worker fatalities at Olympic facilities had
occurred in addition to an unending list of non-pay and accusations of
physical abuse.215
Moreover, the city and national government moved rapidly to
remove migrant laborers from Beijing ahead of the Games. This would
put the discrimination many migrants face on display as well as
highlighting other behaviors like the closure of schools for migrant

212. Wang, supra note 9.
213. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast. China’s Transition to Markets: MarketPreserving Federalism, Chinese Style, 1 J. POL’Y REFORM 149, 156 (1996).
214. China: Beijing’s Migrant Construction Workers Abused, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 12, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/china-beijingsmigrant-construction-workers-abused#.
215. Id.
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children,216 evictions,217 in addition to the aforementioned abuses.218
Taking advantage of these workers’ economic and social vulnerabilities
kept the costs of event infrastructure low, and, as the event neared, the
workers were forbidden from enjoying the events.
That the IOC did not move against China in 2008 could perhaps be
interpreted as part of a learning period in which the former organization
became aware of these behaviors and the international reactions to
them. Yet, 2022 is shaping up to be another missed opportunity for the
IOC to demonstrate through action that which it honors in rhetoric.219
The actions would seem suggest that maybe the IOC is sensitive not to
the divergence of a host’s behaviors from the international norm, but to
the production of the Games.
Furthermore, the IOC has been forced to respond to a diminishing
pool of potential hosts as well as the exogenous changes in the
international system. In the past, be it the Soviet Union’s ascension to
the IOC or the banning of South Africa from it,220 the IOC
operationalized its role as a member of the broader, international
community; one that shared a belief in the institutions of diplomacy and
free exchange. By admitting or denying access to it, it was
(de)legitimizing these actors and encouraging their adoption of the laws
216. China: Beijing Closes Schools for Migrant Children in Pre-Olympic
RTS.
WATCH
(Sept.
25,
2006),
Clean-up,
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/09/25/china-beijing-closes-schools-migrantchildren-pre-olympic-clean.
217. Jonathan Watts, Beijing to Evict ‘Undesirables’ Before Games, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
24,
2008),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/24/china.international?CMP=gu_com.
218. Kitty Bu, Beijing Olympic Clean Up Sweeps Out Migrant Workers,
(July
21,
2008),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympicsREUTERS
migrants/beijing-olympic-clean-up-sweeps-out-migrant-workersidUSSP26521520080721.
219. Stephen Wade, Beijing Olympics Opens in 4 Months; Human Rights Talk
Absent, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 4, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/sports-chinaolympic-team-thomas-bach-tokyo-international-olympic-committee7e9e5a2c49cd8c962f28f7aafe31654a.
220. On This Day: In 1964 South Africa was Banned from the Olympic Games,
SPORTS ENGINE, https://www.sportsengine.com/article/none/south-africa-bannedolympicgames#:~:text=The%20IOC%20revoked%20the%20South,the%20government’s%2
0policy%20of%20apartheid.&text=South%20African%20athletes%20were%20segr
egated,under%20the%20laws%20of%20apartheid (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
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and customs of the hegemonic world order. The IOC has couched these
activities in the sport. The fact that broader Soviet and South African
policies would need to be altered need not have been explicitly
addressed since this was implied. Especially so in the latter case as
apartheid was a foundational social policy that affected all South
African institutions.221
The PRC and its hokou system222 seem to be a ready candidate for
IOC action. At its most basic, the Household Registration System is
state-based discrimination. Its creation of a duality among Chinese
citizens, rural and urban, drives inequality in many social institutions,223
including sport.224 In 2019 the General Administration of Sport (GAS)
advanced a plan to increase facilities in access in previously
underserved rural areas,225 where physical fitness levels were noted to
be at risk with rapid urbanization.226 The above concerns the treatment
of, ostensibly, Han Chinese citizens, who just happened to be born in
rural areas of China. This does not even broach the unequal treatment
of Tibetan,227 Uyghur, 228 or other ethnic minorities within the PRC.229

221. BRIAN LEVY ET. AL, SOUTH AFRICA: WHEN STRONG INSTITUTIONS AND
MASSIVE INEQUALITIES COLLIDE 17 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace eds., 2021).
222. See discussion supra Section III.A.
223. See Jing, supra note 190, at 1086-87.
224. See Xiujin Guo et. al., Urban -Rural Disparity in the Satisfaction with
Public Sports Services: Survey Based Evidence in China, 55 THE SOC. SCI. J. 455,
455-56 (2018).
225. See Xinhua, China to Increase Rural Access to Sports Facilities, CHINA
DAILY
(July
20,
2019),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/20/WS5d31f0eea310d83056400027.html;
see also Guo et. al., supra note 224, at 455-56.
226. Yunxi Tian et. al., Urban-Rural Differences in Physical Fitness and Outof-School Physical Activity for Primary School Students: A County-Level Comparison
in Western China, 18 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 1, 1-2, 14 (2021).
227. See Ethnic Minorities in China: Tibetans and Uighurs: Hearing Before the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 107th Cong. (2002),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg80922/html/CHRG107hhrg80922.htm.
228. See Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repressionuyghurs-xinjiang (last updated Mar. 1, 2021, 7:00 AM).
229. See “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots” China’s Crimes Against
Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslins, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 19,
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The PRC has a highly centralized sporting system that is focused
on winning gold for the sake of national glory.230 The GAS was
empowered by the Sports Law of the People’s Republic of China and
The Plan for Olympic Glories, each introduced in 1995.231 Like South
Africa, state policies like the Hokou are inseparable from sporting
policies and need be reconciled to one another. For instance, if the best
sporting facilities are in urban areas, will rural citizens have equal
access and equal opportunity to compete at the highest levels of Chinese
sport? Or, as was the case with South Africa, would the PRC’s national
team be the result of a process of unequal competition?
The fact that the IOC has pursued the path it has seems even more
divergent considering FIFA’s relationship with its own 2022 World
Cup’s host, Qatar. Qatar is heavily reliant on oil rents which the central
government uses to fund social services and makes direct payments to
citizens.232 This degree of reliance on one economic resource and sector
discourages investment and support of other economic sectors as well
as disincentivizes the citizens’ need to work.233 In such a setting, labor
must be imported for service industry work, construction, and similar
forms of labor. The kafala system ensures low-cost workers for these
sectors.234

2021),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-theirroots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting.
230. Hannah Beech, The Chinese Sports Machine’s Single Goal: The Most
TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2021),
Golds,
at
any
Cost,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/29/world/asia/china-olympics.html; see also
Jinming Zheng et. al., Sport Policy in China (Mainland), 10 INT’L J. SPORTS POL’Y &
POLS. 469, 474 (2018).
231. Jinming Zheng et. al., supra note 230, at 474.
232. Nader Kabbani & Nejla Ben Mimoune, Economic Diversification in the
Gulf: Time to Redouble Efforts, BROOKINGS (Jan. 31, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-diversification-in-the-gulf-time-toredouble-efforts/.
233. Alia Alzubair, The Need for Economic Diversification in the Oil
Dependent Nations of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Nigeria: Possible Pathways and
Outcomes, FORDHAM UNIV. RSCH. COMMONS (May 22, 2021) (Senior Thesis,
Fordham
University),
at
24-25,
https://research.library.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1060&context=inte
rnational_senior.
234. Kali Robinson, What is the Kafala System?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system.
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The kafala system directly contravened internationally accepted
labor rights235 and arguably upheld a form of state-sponsored human
trafficking that was soon apparent to observers. The practice of
confiscating and withholding a worker’s personal papers
(identification, passports, etc.) and thus their free choice of movement
is a common ploy of traffickers. Further, the detention of workers, and
their ensuing inability to leave one job for another, is another common
feature of human trafficking.236
FIFA’s choice of Qatar was heavily scrutinized by observers who
found it an unacceptable choice. Eventually, an investigation by the
United States’ Department of Justice revealed that there had been a
good deal of financial malpractice under then FIFA president Sepp
Blatter.237 The steady stream of bad information was only compounded
by the increasing awareness that Qatar’s selection and the ensuing event
construction was driving a surge in worker exploitation and even
fatalities.238 This was the first many had heard of the kafala system and
the treatment of migrant laborers under it.

235. Caroline Dumoulin, The Kafala System: Incremental Reform is not Enough
to Stop Abuse Against Migrant Domestic Workers, GEORGE WASH. L. INT’L L. &
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FIFA found itself in a position where it needed to re-legitimate
itself as a member of those institutions. Actors within this institution
from governments to MNCs began to impress upon the organization
their desire that it bring its behaviors back in-line with good governance
practice as well as the dominant norms of human rights.239 In so doing,
it was able to affect change in the nation to its kafala system and wider
behaviors relative to migrants.240 FIFA chose to emphasize its
institutional role, which its mission serves.
The IOC, alternatively, by emphasizing that sport is apolitical,241
has denied its place in the process of institutionalizing the behaviors
and practices important for, certainly labor rights as discussed here, but
other norms that have become hegemonic in the international system.242
As actors and organizations attempt to influence change, they will find
the IOC not merely an empty node, but a counterforce to their activities.
That China has no fears of international condemnation or IOC critique
has been noted. Historian Xu Guoqi has said the greatest difference
between 2008 and 2022 in Chinese attitudes was their wish to improve
world opinion in the former, and its indifference to it in the latter.243
The International Trade Union Confederation has documented a
crack down on unions, forced labor, and ill-treatment of ethnic and
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LGBTQ+ minorities.244 Their report, China: A gold medal for
repression, details five practices of repression they liken to the Olympic
rings.245 Stories and reports of this nature will likely intensify as the
opening ceremonies near. With no fear of having the event moved from
Beijing, nor of being denied the right to participate in the international
sporting institutions (and thus remain legitimate), the PRC has no
incentive to alter its behaviors. If anything, it has an ally willing to run
interference between it and its critics.
CONCLUSION
The year 2022 will see two of history’s most controversial sporting
events. What is true is that the FIFA World Cup in Qatar and the Beijing
Winter Olympic Games will be held with a good deal of attention on
their respective behaviors and questions about their suitability as hosts,
especially in terms of labor rights where each nation has had a less than
satisfactory history of behaviors. The poor treatment of migrant
laborers in construction, internationally and internally, has been
juxtaposed with the messaging of these mega-events.
There would be little doubt about what the IOC’s position will be
when the Winter Games commence in February 2022. When IOC
president Bach was asked about the potential United States boycott, he
repeated the familiar refrain about the IOC being apolitical.246 The IOC
announced it will be a hollow node in the institutional progress of labor
rights in the international system. With the next three Games’ hosts
already selected, and each being a “safe” choice, it is likely that the IOC
sees itself as simply needing to survive 2022 and leave any critiques in
the rearview mirror.
This article has outlined an understanding of the IOC’s place in the
practice of institutional law making. The IOC is an important player, as
it is the central hub of the international sporting regime. It has the ability
to (de)legitimize, relative to internationally accepted norms of behavior,
the actors with which it interacts. Yet, instead of accepting this role, the
IOC often defers to a narrower mission, one characterized by its
244. China: A Gold Medal for Repression, INT’L TRADE UNION
CONFEDERATION (Sept. 11, 2021), https://www.ituc-csi.org/china-a-gold-medal-forrepression-news.
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function as manager of the Olympics. This downplays its agency in the
international system, and thus forgives it of any responsibility it has in
being a proactive member in the process of institutional law making.
Future research focusing on the codification of international sports
law and its hard or soft nature, as well as the processes that contribute
to it, will need to take into account the evolving international system in
which these events take place. Just as the Great Recession of a decade
ago affected the pool of potential hosts, so too might the COVID-19
pandemic. Will the commodification of the Games and other events
increase? Will the practice of selecting a host change and will this
change the nature of the Games? Perhaps most consequentially, will the
IOC be able to maintain itself as a legitimate actor within the
international system as it adapts to these new realities? International
pressure from states and organizations will be needed for these changes
to come to fruition.
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